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Recent Decisions
Conflict Of Laws - Gambling Contract Not Enforceable
As Against Public Policy Though Valid Where Entered Into.
Intercontinental Hotels Corp. v. Golden, 238 N.Y.S. 2d 33
(Sup. Ct. 1963). Plaintiff sought to recover in a New York
court the amount of a gambling debt incurred by the de-
fendant in Puerto Rico, a jurisdiction where gambling has
been legalized. The Supreme Court, Appellate Division,
in a 3-2 decision reversed a judgment for the plaintiff in
the lower court, applying the traditional "choice of law"
rule, that a contract's legality is ordinarily determined
by the law of the place where it is made but that a
state need not enforce a contract which is contrary to
its public policy. 6 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (Rev. ed. 1938),§ 1792, p. 5095, and RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934),§ 612, p. 731. The majority held that the clear and strong
public policy of New York would not allow a plaintiff
to recover on a debt arising out of a gambling transaction
even though gambling was legal where the debt arose.
The Court asserted that the New York Constitution and
Penal Law evidenced a long-standing policy against gambl-
ing and that such a policy could not be disregarded even
when an out-of-state transaction was involved. A strong
dissenting opinion contended that the public policy of New
York was not sufficiently expressive of forum policy against
gambling to invalidate gambling agreements entered into
outside the state's borders. The prohibitions against
gambling, in the various state laws, were considered to
be guidelines of conduct for the citizens of New York,
within the borders of the state, and not intended to limit
the citizen's activity outside the state or to be used to
invalidate contracts completely valid where made.
In Maryland the Court of Appeals has followed the
general "choice of law" rule, holding that contracts valid
where made will be enforced in Maryland unless they
are contrary to the public policy of this State. Baltimore
and Ohio R.R. Co. v. Glenn, 28 Md. 287 (1868). Gambling
contracts entered into within Maryland have been held to
be contrary to the public policy of the State and hence
invalid. Spies v. Rosenstock, 87 Md. 14, 39 A. 268 (1898).
Whether the public policy of Maryland against gambling
is meant to apply to gambling contracts made outside
Maryland remains an open issue. The dissent points out
that the increased respectability of gambling and the in-
troduction of it into additional forums would indicate that
a state's public policy should not so apply.
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International Law - Resident Member Of Cuban Dele-
gation To United Nations Not Entitled To Diplomatic
Immunity. United States of America ex rel. Casanova v.
Fitzpatrick, 214 F. Supp. 425 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). Petitioner
was a Cuban national serving as an attache and resident
member of the Staff of the Permanent Mission of Cuba to
the United Nations. He was arrested on a charge of con-
spiracy to commit sabotage and to violate the Foreign
Agent's Registration Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2155(b) (1958). He
sought his release by habeas corpus on the grounds that
he was entitled to diplomatic immunity and not subject to
the jurisdiction of the court.
Petitioner claimed that the U.N. CHARTER, ART. 105,
para. 2 was self-executing and required absolute and auto-
matic diplomatic immunity for representatives of member
nations and their staffs. The Court (Weinfeld, J.) rejected
this contention, basing its decision on various reports from
the San Francisco Conference in which the term "diplo-
matic immunity" was purposely avoided and wherein it
was said that only a functional immunity, confined to acts
necessary for the independent exercise of functions con-
nected with the UN, was granted. The petitioner next con-
tended that under U.S. Const. Art. III, Sec. 2, and 28 U.S.C.§ 1251 (a) (2) (1958), which gives the Supreme Court ex-
clusive jurisdiction against public ministers of foreign
states, the District Court was without jurisdiction. The
Court rejected this claim also, stating that this section of
the Constitution and the judicial code applies only to diplo-
matic representatives accredited to the United States. The
essence of the petitioner's claim, however, was that he was
entitled to immunity under Art. 5, § 15 (2) of the Head-
quarters Agreement of the United Nations, 61 STAT. 762(1947). Section 15(1) of this Headquarters Agreement
provides for diplomatic immunity for the principal resident
representative to the United Nations from each nation,
while section 15(2) provides for diplomatic immunity for
"such resident members of their staffs as may be agreed
upon between the Secretary-General, the Government of
the United States and the Government of the member con-
cerned * * * " The Court, interpreting section 15(2), de-
cided (1) that the State Department certificate, stating
that there was no agreement to extend to petitioner diplo-
matic immunity, did not foreclose the Court from consid-
ering the question and, (2) that section 15(2) requires an
agreement as to each individual on a staff and not, as peti-
tioner contended, to categories of staff personnel. The
Court then denied the petition for writ of habeas corpus
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and held that the issuance of a visa and a landing card to
the petitioner was nothing more than part of the United
States' obligation under Art. 4, §§ 11 and 13 of the Head-
quarters Agreement not to impede petitioner's transit to
UN Headquarters, and was not an agreement by the United
States under Art. 5, § 15(2) to extend diplomatic immunity
to petitioner. For further reference see United States v.
Coplan, 84 F. Supp. 472 (S.D.N.Y. 1949) and Gross, Im-
munities and Privileges of Delegations to the United Na-
tions, 16 International Organizations 483 (1962).
Joint Tenancy - Felonious Killer Barred From Acquir-
ing Deceased's Share Of Property Held In Joint Tenancy.
In re Cox Estate, ...... Mont ....... , 380 P. 2d 584 (1963).
In a Probate Court action to determine and declare the
rights and interests in the estate of deceased, Bess Cox,
the court determined that she was feloniously killed by
her husband, who then committed suicide. Husband and
wife had owned certain real property in joint tenancy.
The heirs of the dead husband brought this action to
establish their claim to the wife's undivided one half
interest in the property. Their claim was that their an-
cestor, the husband, had become the sole owner of the
property at the instant he killed his wife and that it
was outside the province of the judiciary to modify in
any way the right of survivorship in a joint tenancy, a
matter established by statute without any exceptions. The
Probate Court ruled that the plaintiffs had no right to
the wife's share. The Supreme Court of Montana affirmed
and dismissed the plaintiff's argument as being contra-
dictory to the equitable doctrine of preventing one from
benefiting from his own wrong. The majority asserted
that a substantial benefit would accrue to the tenant who
kills his co-tenant and then himself, though the enjoyment
of the benefit is postponed to his heirs.
The Court cited the Maryland case of Price v. Hitaffer,
164 Md. 505, 165 A. 470 (1933), in which the Court of
Appeals applied this doctrine and denied a felonious killer
and his heirs their rights, as statutory heirs, to the victim's
estate. The Montana Supreme Court could find no reason
for treating statutes concerning joint tenancy differently
from those concerning intestate succession. In view of the
equities of the case a constructive trust was placed on
the wife's share of the joint tenancy. The husband, being
a trustee holding title to the wife's share for the benefit
of her heirs, thus lacked a beneficial interest which the
appellants could claim to have inherited. Similar results
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have been reached in several recent cases. See Budwit v.
Herr, 339 Mich. 265, 63 N.W. 2d 841 (1954) and Cowan
v. Pleasant, 263 S.W. 2d 494 (Ky. 1953). A thorough
analysis of this point is found in 17 Md. L. Rev. 45 (1957).
For further reference see 4 Scourr, TRUSTS (2d ed. 1956)
Ch. 13, § 493.2; RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION (1937) § 188;
18 Md. L. Rev. 266 (1959).
Parent And Child - Parental Liability For Malicious
Conduct Of A Minor Child. General Insurance Company
of America v. Faulkner, 259 N.C. 317, 130 S.E. 2d 645 (1963).
Freddie Faulkner, an eleven-year-old living with his par-
ents, was admitted to have maliciously and wilfully set fire
to the furnishings of Teachers Memorial School proxi-
mately causing damage in the amount of $2,916.50. The
plaintiff insurer, as subrogee to the school, brought this
action for $500.00, the maximum limit, under a North
Carolina statute, Gen. Stat. N.C. § 1-538.1 (Cum. Supp.
1961), imposing vicarious liability upon the parents of
minors for "damages for malicious or wilfull destruction
of property by minors". Defendants demurred to the com-
plaint, claiming that the statute was unconstitutional. The
Supreme Court of North Carolina conceded that the stat-
ute reversed the established common law rule, whereby
parents were not liable for the torts of their children, but
held that such statute was not a failure of due process of
law under State or Federal Constitutions. North Carolina
is the third state to uphold the constitutionality of these
statutes; see Kelly v. Williams, 346 S.W. 2d 434 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1961) and Palmyra Board of Education, Burlington
County v. Hansen, 56 N.J. Super. 567, 153 A. 2d 393 (1959).
Thirty-two states now have similar anti-vandalism stat-
utes, 40 North Carolina L. Rev. 619 (1962). The primary pur-
pose of these statutes is to fight juvenile delinquency and,
under equitable principles, to relieve the innocent parties
of part of the financial burden resulting from such activities
by juveniles. These statutes vary in form, although they
have essentially the same effect. In California the liability
is in addition to any existing liability imposed by law, Cal.
Civil Code § 1714.1. In Tennessee there is no liability on
parents if they can show exercise of due care and diligence,
Tenn. Code Anno. § 37-1003 (Cum. Supp. 1963). In Mary-
land, the legislature has not seen fit to pass a general anti-
vandalism statute though several attempts have been made.
Montgomery County, however, has partially corrected the
situation by giving a judge of the People's Court for
Juvenile Causes in that County the power to require a
19641
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parent to make restitution for the destructive acts of his
child, see 2 MD. CODE (Cum. Supp. 1962) Art. 26, § 76(i).
Religious Societies - Majority Group Enjoined From
Using Church Property For Teaching Of Doctrines Con-
trary To Beliefs For Which Property Was Dedicated.
Holiman v. Dovers, ...... Ark ....... , 366 S.W. 2d 197 (1963).
Plaintiffs, a minority faction in the Landmark Missionary
Baptist Church of Traskwood, Arkansas, a self-governing
congregational church, sought to enjoin Dovers, the pastor,
and the majority group, from using the church property
for the preaching of doctrines fundamentally contrary to
the original faith and to which the property had been
dedicated. The trial court refused to grant the relief, stat-
ing that the doctrinal differences were too minor for judi-
cial cognizance. In granting the relief, the Supreme Court
of Arkansas held that the controlling faction of a self-
governing congregational church may not divert church
property for uses for or in support of doctrines contrary
to the beliefs and dogma for which the church was dedi-
cated. The Court stated that equitable relief is a proper
remedy to be invoked to protect the property kept in
trust for the practice of a particular type of religious
creed and that courts should not hesitate to assume juris-
diction when a schism affects property rights. They fur-
ther decided that no judicial determination of religious
doctrine was necessary, for, through the use of experts,
a factual finding could be made as to whether there had
been such a departure from the original beliefs as to
justify the relief sought. One judge dissented, asserting
that there was no way the Court could decide the ques-
tion without judicially determining what the fundamental
religious tenets of the Landmark Baptist Church originally
were, and then comparing them to the tenets of the pres-
ent majority to see if there had been such a deviation
as claimed by the minority. To do this was to "embark on
a sea of religious turmoil that may ultimately result in
shipwreck."
Brown v. Scott, 138 Md. 237, 113 A. 727 (1921), involved
an attempt by a majority of church trustees to change
religious affiliation from Methodist to Episcopal. This was
successfully thwarted by an injunction. The Court of Ap-
peals held that while any number of members are free to
affiliate with whatever group they choose, they cannot by
so doing affect the property rights of others nor divert the
use of property held in trust for a delineated purpose to a
different one. For further reference see: 45 Am. Jur.,
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Religious Societies, § 54 (1943); Annot., 70 A.L.R. 75
(1931); for a contrast in scope of application see Davis v.
Scher, 356 Mich. 291, 97 N.W. 2d 137 (1959) and Katz v.
Goldman, 33 Ohio App. 150, 168 N.E. 763 (1929).
Severance - Same Counsel Representing CoDefendants
With Conflicting Interests. Case v. North Carolina, 315 F.
2d 743 (4th Cir. 1963). The defendant was jointly indicted
with codefendant for a capital offense, and the same at-
torney was retained by both. Counsel moved for a sever-
ance on the ground that he represented both defendants
and expected a conflict of interest to arise; the motion was
denied. A conflict did in fact arise on the admission into
evidence of codefendant's confession implicating and throw-
ing the burden of guilt on defendant. Codefendant received
a life sentence and defendant a death sentence. In habeas
corpus proceedings the Court held that failure to grant a
severance, where codefendants were represented by same
counsel and a conflict of interest was imminent, constituted
a denial of defendant's right to effective representation and
undivided loyalty of counsel during his trial on a capital
offense. The dissent noted that since conflicts of interest
are inherent in any joint trial the ruling will permit code-
fendants in capital cases to force severance by the simple
device of retaining the same counsel.
Most conflict of interest cases deal with appointed coun-
sel representing both codefendants. The leading case is
Glasser v. U.S., 315 U.S. 60 (1942), which held that where
a court appointed defendant's counsel to also represent co-
defendant over the objections of defendant, and with notice
of potential conflicting interests, defendant was deprived of
effective assistance of counsel. The Supreme Court also
stated that the burden of representing codefendants may
impair counsel's effectiveness even without any conflict of
interest. In later cases the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
has attempted to limit the scope of the Glasser rule by re-
quiring both an actual conflict of interest and a timely pro-
test. Farris v. Hunter, 144 F. 2d 63 (10th Cir. 1944); Roberts
v. Hunter, 140 F. 2d 38 (10th Cir. 1943). Where these es-
sentials are in the record it has been deemed error for a
court to deny severance on motion made by counsel for co-
defendants. Wright v. Johnston, 77 F. Supp. 687 (N.D. Cal.
1948).
In Maryland every man has a right to be "allowed"
counsel. Maryland Declaration of Rights, Art. XXI. Note,
The Right to Counsel for Indigents in State Criminal Trials,
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23 Md. L. Rev. 332 (1963). To show error in denying a
severance there must be a motion based on actual or im-
minently potential hostility of interest which deprived de-
fendant of impartial and adequate representation. Jones
v. State, 185 Md. 481, 487, 45 A. 2d 350 (1945); Pressely v.
State, 220 Md. 558, 155 A. 2d 494 (1959). A case significant
in light of the fears of the dissenting opinion in the
principal case is U.S. v. Bernett, 103 F. Supp. 39 (Md. 1952),
in which defendant and codefendant on trial for robbery
knowingly retained the same counsel. The Court ruled
defendant to be estopped from later asserting the inade-
quacy of his counsel. For further reference see People v.
Lanigan, 22 Cal. 2d 569, 140 P. 2d 24 (1943) ; People v. Rose,
348 Ill. 214, 180 N.E. 791 (1932); Fellman, Right to Counsel
Under State Law, 1955 Wis. L. Rev. 281 (1955); and Note,
Right to Benefit of Counsel Under the Federal Constitution,
42 Col. L. Rev. 271 (1942).
Torts - Illegitimate Child May Maintain Action For
Wrongful Death Of Mother. Sneed v. Henderson, ..... Tenn.
...... , 366 S.W. 2d 758 (1963). The plaintiff, an illegitimate
child, commenced this action to collect damages for the
wrongful death of his mother under Tenn. Code Ann.§ 20-607 (1956), which provides that such right of action
".... shall pass ... to his children or to his next of kin .... "
The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff. The
Supreme Court of Tennessee, on appeal, took the view that
the wrongful death statute was in the nature of a law of
descent and distribution and was for the benefit of those
who would be beneficiaries under intestacy laws. An in-
testacy statute, Tenn. Code Ann. § 31-205 (1956), provides
that an illegitimate child shall share equally with the legi-
timate children in the distribution of the deceased
mother's personal property. Positing its decision on this
statute, the Court reasoned that the illegitimate child was
included by necessary implication within the terms "chil-
dren" and "next of kin" as used in the wrongful death
statute. Because the recovery in a wrongful death action
becomes the personal property of the decedent's estate, in
which the illegitimate child would share equally with the
legitimate children, the Court reasoned that the illegiti-
mate child should also have an equal right to bring suit,
and held that under the laws of Tennessee an illegitimate
child may maintain an action for the wrongful death of its
mother.
6 MD. CODE (Cum. Supp. 1962) Art. 67, § 4 creates a
wrongful death action for the benefit of the child and pro-
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vides that "'child' shall include an illegitimate child when-
ever the person whose death is so caused is the mother of
such child ... ." The damages recoverable are based upon
the pecuniary interest of the equitable plaintiff in the life
of the person killed. Maryland has thus by statute solved
the problem with which the Tennessee court was faced.
For further reference see State, Use of Holt v. Try, Inc.,
220 Md. 270, 152 A. 2d 126 (1959); PROSSER, TORTS (2d ed.
1955) § 105, pp. 709-19; and Annot. 72 A.L.R. 2d 1235 (1960).
Torts - United States Not Liable Under Federal Tort
Claims Act For Alleged Negligent Hurricane Advisories.
Bartie v. United States, 216 F. Supp. 10 (W.D.La. 1963).
Plaintiff and his family resided on the Gulf Coast near
Cameron, Louisiana. Hurricane Audrey, which struck this
coastal area in 1957, claimed the lives of his wife and five
children. Plaintiff sued the United States Government
under the Federal Tort Claims Act on the theory that the
Government Weather Bureau was negligent in failing to
give adequate warning of the approaching storm as well as
the approximate correct time the hurricane would strike
the coast. The Court (Hunter, J.), after examining the evi-
dence and noting that no expert had testified to any negli-
gence, determined that the official advisories were tech-
nically more than adequate, but that the forecasts received
by the coastal people were not sufficient to convey the
urgency of the situation. Since the Weather Bureau did
not own or operate any of the broadcast facilities by which
these forecasts were publicized, the Court held that the
plaintiff had not established the defendant's negligence by
a preponderance of the evidence.
Continuing, the Court stated that, even if plaintiff could
have established some negligence on the part of the Weather
Bureau and brought himself within the ambit of the act,
the instant case came within the "discretionary function"
exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C.
§ 2680(a) (1958), and thus barred plaintiff from any re-
covery. The Court pointed out that the content and word-
ing of the bulletins and advisories, which were in fact what
the plaintiff had complained of, as well as the means and
manner chosen to communicate these to the public, were
determinations made by administrators involving
policy, judgment and discretion", and thus came within
the above mentioned "discretionary function" exception as
interpreted in Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953).
For further reference see Mid-Central Fish Co. v. United
1964]
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States, 112 F. Supp. 792 (W.D. Mo. 1953) and Western
Mercantile Co. v. United States, 111 F. Supp. 799 (W.D. Mo.
1953).
Trade Regulation - Power Of Federal Trade Commis-
sion To Hold Advertising Reference To Manufacturer's List
Price An Unfair Practice In Commerce. Giant Foods, Inc.
v. F.T.C.. ...... F. 2d ...... (D.C. Cir. 1963). Giant Foods, Inc.,
a Delaware corporation operating retail stores in the Wash-
ington, D.C. metropolitan area, including Maryland, peti-
tioned the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia to review a Federal Trade Commission cease and de-
sist order against Giant's practice of referring to the "man-
ufacturer's list price" in advertising goods, when that price
was not the "usual and customary" retail price in the
area. The Commission had held this to be in violation
of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)
(6) (1958), prohibiting "unfair or deceptive acts or prac-
tices in commerce". The Commission had determined that
the practice was deceptive in that the term "manufacturer's
list price" conveyed to the public that that was the price
for which the particular article sold for in other area
stores, when such was not the case. The petitioner con-
tended it was a legitimate practice for purposes of com-
parison. The D.C. Court of Appeals (McGowan, J.), in
affirming the order, held that, while such use of "manu-
facturer's list price" was not unlawful in itself, the refer-
ences to such became so if the list prices were not those
adhered to by other area retailers. The Court then de-
cided that the Commission had submitted enough evi-
dence to show that the manufacturer's list price was not
the "usual and customary" retail price in the area.
The Court of Appeals thus adhered to the established
view that this type of regulatory law is made to protect
the general public - Helbros Watch Co., Inc. v. F.T.C.,
310 F. 2d 868 (D.C. Cir. 1962) cert. den., 373 U.S. 976
(1963) - and that, given sufficient evidence at a fair
hearing, it is for the F.T.C. and not the Court of Ap-
peals to draw reasonable inferences therefrom in order to
determine the ultimate impression of a particular practice
on the mind of the purchasing public. See Baltimore Lug-
gage Co. v. F.T.C., 296 F. 2d 608 (4th Cir. 1961), cert. den.,
369 U.S. 860 (1962), Vanity Fair Paper Mills, Inc. v. F.T.C.,
311 F. 2d 480, 488 (2d Cir. 1962) and Niresk Industries, Inc.
v. F.T.C., 278 F. 2d 337 (7th Cir. 1960), cert. den., 364
U.S. 883 (1960). For further references see Annot., 65
A.L.R. 2d 220 (1959).
